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Abstract—There exists unequivocal evidence denoting the dire
consequences which organisations and governmental institutions
face from insider threats. While the in-depth knowledge of the
modus operandi that insiders possess provides ground for more
sophisticated attacks, organisations are ill-equipped to detect and
prevent these from happening. The research community has
provided various models and detection systems to address the
problem, but the lack of real data due to privacy and ethical
issues remains a significant obstacle for validating and designing
effective and scalable systems. In this paper, we present the results
and our experiences from applying our detection system into a
multinational organisation, the approach followed to abide with
the ethical and privacy considerations and the lessons learnt
on how the validation process refined the system in terms of
effectiveness and scalability.
Index Terms—Insider threat; anomaly detection; real world
case study; Machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
The diffusion of information systems into governmental
and private organisations has rapidly changed the landscape
of threats these institutions face. In the modern digitalised
environment, the threat that insiders may pose has grown
significantly and several industry surveys denote the dire con-
sequences of such attacks [1, 2]. As the survey conducted by
ISACA reports, almost 60% of the attacks which organisations
experienced in 2014 originated from a malicious or accidental
insider [3]. Thus, the security controls and policies which
organisations adopt to prevent external attacks have been
proven to be inadequate to deter insider attacks.
Another important characteristic of insider threats is the
impact on the businesses, which according to Ponemon’s Cy-
ber Crime report in 2014, the mean annualised cost exceeded
seven million [2]. To make matters worse, companies are ill-
equipped to respond to insider attacks; according to US State
Cybercrime survey, only 50% of those who participated in the
study had respond strategies for mitigating the impact from
such attacks.
In an attempt to address the challenge of insider threats,
research community has proposed various systems and models.
These span from defining what an insider threat is and concep-
tualising the problem [4], to understanding the human element
and the psychological factors involved [5], and to implement-
ing information systems that detect anomalies indicative of
insider threat behaviour [6–8].
While research in the area of insider threat has advanced,
the absence of real world data from organisations creates
significant difficulties in validating and refining the proposed
models. Insider threat incidents, if detected, are under-reported
by organisations, while access to data which is crucial for
detection systems is scarce due to ethical and privacy issues.
As a result, systems are calibrated and tested on synthetic
datasets, with the biases it implies.
For the needs of the Corporate Insider Threat Detection
(CITD) project, we developed a system to detect anomalies
indicative of insider threat behaviour and validated it on syn-
thetic datasets developed in-house [9]. In this paper, we extend
this work and investigate the scalability and performance of
our system on an anonymised version of real data, in which a
known insider attack has been identified by the organisation’s
head of security. In particular, we focus on the scalability
issues we faced and on the enhancement of performance when
we attempted to apply our system to data from a multinational
technology company. We report the lessons learnt and the
challenges on validating our system while abiding to ethical
and privacy principals.
In what follows, Section II reflects on proposed models and
detection systems for insider threats, Section III summarises
the research undertaken as part of the CITD project that led to
the development of the detection system, Section IV provides
the results of our validation, while Section V reflects on the
outcome and provides insights on how to refine the system
further. Finally, Section VI elaborates on the lessons learnt
from applying the CITD system to real world data, Section VII
presents our future plans and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. REFLECTING ON INSIDER THREAT RESEARCH
A. Conceptualising the insider-threat problem
The overgrowing implications of the insider-threat problem
has attracted the interest of the research community over
the last fifteen years. The in-depth knowledge which insiders
possess of the security controls, the monitoring practices, and
the modus operandi of organisations allows for targeted and
sophisticated attacks with dire consequences. Detecting and
preventing insider attacks raises significant challenges and
insightful research has been focusing on understanding the
human element, identifying patterns of attacks and creating
conceptual models of insider behaviour [5, 10, 11].
Pioneers in conceptualising the problem of insider threat
is the CERT research programme conducted by Carnegie
Mellon University [12–15]. Using System Dynamics as a
methodological framework, the CERT project examined var-
ious real cases of insider attacks which were classified in
four broad categories namely Information Technology(IT)
Sabotage, Intellectual Property (IP) theft, Data and Financial
Fraud, and Espionage. Observations from the case studies were
used to identify ‘critical paths’ which insiders follow and
reveal patterns. Specific emphasis was given on understanding
the human element and qualitative characteristics, such as
disgruntlement or dissatisfaction, which were central to under-
standing and modelling insider behaviour. This comprehensive
work provided valuable insight into understanding the nature
of insider threat and led in a series of MERIT (Management
and Education of the Risk of Insider Threat) studies.
Complementary works followed different perspectives for
distilling insider attacks. Sarkar [16] built on the CERT models
and considered factors who may act as precursors of an attack
(i.e. psychology of an attacker, reduced loyalty, historical
behaviour). In addition, insiders are categorised in those who
act maliciously and those who unintentionally facilitate an
attack, either due to negligence, or due to violation of policies
and procedures to facilitate their daily tasks. In a similar vein,
Pfleeger et al. created a taxonomy for capturing the actions
of the insiders by eliciting elements from the organisation,
the environment and the system which insiders exploited
[17]. Finally, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
discussed how behavioural aspects and personality traits may
provide indications of insider threats and reflect on prevention
measurements [18].
B. Detecting insider threats
A different strand of literature has focused on designing and
implementing systems to detect and prevent insider attacks.
Despite of the in-depth knowledge of an organisation, insiders
may leave digital fingerprints to be captured when an attack
is executed [19]. In addition, behavioural characteristics and
precursor elements may be mapped to changes in the digital
profile of an employee. It is possible then to raise alerts
indicative of an insider threat when these changes are detected.
One of the most common methods used to capture changes
in employees’ digital footprint is anomaly detection. Digital
activities of employees can form sequences of actions, which
overtime may build a profile used as a baseline for detection.
Observed sequences of actions which deviate from the normal
profile may be regarded as potentially anomalous behaviour.
Parveen and Thuraisingham [20] presented such an approach
and introduced the notion of concept-drift to indicate em-
ployee’s behavioural change over time. Their approach uses
unsupervised learning techniques and processes vast volumes
of streaming data using stream and graph mining [21].
Other research articles have focused on how to extract
features indicative of insider threat based on data which
organisations collect and provided different algorithms for
detecting suspicious activity [22–24]. A noteworthy example
is presented in [25] where the authors obtained access to
organisations’ databases and explored data from employees’
laptops. Their validation approach consider as normal the data
obtained, and inserted logs which corresponded to malicious
activity providing them the ground truth. They then tested the
effectiveness of seventeen different detection algorithms. A
visual language to illustrate features was provided as well.
Over 100 features were captured, however, there is little
discussion on how these were identified.
Several cases have been reported were insiders colluded
to execute an attack. Chen and Malin [26] to identify suspi-
cious collaborative behaviour by creating a user-relationship
network using unsupervised learning techniques. Their model
is tested on access logs from an electronic health record
system in a medical centre. Other proposed detection systems
endeavoured to infer psychological and behavioural factors
from users’ activity and incorporate these features into the
anomaly detection algorithms [27, 28]. Brdiczka et al. [7], in
particular, refined their initial detection system with the addi-
tion of psychological profiling to reduce the number of false-
positive alerts. Another interesting approach is using Bayesian
networks to infer the behavioural attributes of users based on
sentiment analysis on text and social network analysis [29].
Finally, Bishop et al. [30] investigated how process mod-
elling may shed light into detecting insider activity. By for-
malising processes, they explored which tasks are managed by
which agents and analysed the various ways which processes
may be compromised, suggesting counter measures to increase
the resilience of processes to insider attacks.
The design of the proposed systems is driven by the different
types of data available to the research community. Most of
the published work is validated on synthetic data and on
the scarce occasions where real data from organisations is
available, malicious activity is inserted. Especially datasets
which are based on real data with the insertion of malicious
activity, such as DARPA ADAMS, provide valuable insight
and a great opportunity to the research community to test and
improve detection systems. In our work, we were fortunate
to test our system on real world data without the need to
insert synthetic malicious activity because the organisation had
a well-known case of insider. Real data exhibits patterns in
people’s behaviour that is difficult to simulate and since it is a
rare opportunity to experiment with only real data, this paper
endeavours to fill this gap.
III. THE CORPORATE INSIDER THREAT DETECTION
PROJECT
The CITD project is sponsored by the UK Centre for
the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). The project
brings together two groups from the University of Oxford,
the University of Leicester and Cardiff University. The aim
of the project is to develop an investigative tool to detect
potential insider threats while adhering to ethical and privacy
considerations.
Our core approach and proposed framework for modelling
the insider-threat problem goes beyond traditional technolog-
ical observations and incorporates a more complete view of
insider threats, common precursors, and human actions and
behaviours [31]. The conceptual model proposed for insider
threats provided a reasoning structure to analysts that can make
or draw hypotheses regarding a potential insider threat based
on measurements from real-world observations.
Due to the scarce data available on insider attacks, the Uni-
versity of Leicester conducted several interviews with insiders
who were convicted for their malicious behaviour and security
experts from organisations which suffered from insider attacks.
More than 120 cases were identified and examined. The
analysis of these case studies provided a framework to fully
characterise insider attacks. This included a clear definition
of why employees are motivated to attack, who is more
prone to attack, the human factors that lead to malicious and
accidental threats and how individual’s background may affect
the likelihood of an attack being realised. We also identified
what the common attack vectors and steps within an attack
are, and what assets and vulnerabilities are typically targeted
[32, 33].
We further deconstructed all 120 cases to identify unique
attack steps, which describe atomic activities that took place
during these attacks. We then created a chain of attack steps
that culminate in the end-goal of the attacker (e.g., committing
fraud), designed attack-pattern graphs comprising the attack
steps, and highlighted the most prevalent paths for every attack
type [34].
The culmination of our efforts was the design of an
automated detection system described in detail in [9]. The
architecture of the system is illustrated in Figure 1. The system
parses various types of log activity (file logs, web logs, email
logs, login/log-off logs etc) and builds tree profiles for every
employee and every role. Based on these profiles, features
indicative of insider threat are extracted. These features are
processed based on a semi-supervised approach. Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) is used to reduce the dimensional-
ity and cluster similar behaviour. We use as a baseline a certain
amount of days and the detection of anomalous behaviour is
performed on a daily basis. The values of features are plotted
in the reduced dimensional space and if considered abnormal
alerts are raised.
We created a three-tier alert system. The first level of
alerts consists of policy violations and tripwires based on
well-known attacks. The second level of alerts is threshold-
based and assesses the Euclidean distances of the plotted
features. The third level are deviation-based anomalies running
statistical assessments on the values of the Euclidean distances.
Human analysts can engage to provide an active learning
feedback loop. By adopting an accept-or-reject scheme, the
analyst is able to refine the underlying detection model to
reduce the false-positive rate.
In [9] we validated the system on synthetic scenarios
developed in-house. Here, we reflect on the results from this
process, refine the system and further apply it on real dataset.
IV. APPLYING THE SYSTEM TO DATA FROM A
MULTINATIONAL ORGANISATION
Validating the automated part of the CITD detection system
does not only provide the means to assess the effectiveness of
the tool, but also the opportunity to gain insight into how it
could be further optimised to identify anomalies indicative of
insider threats. We applied the CITD detection system to data
obtained from a multinational corporation. The organisation
was aware of an insider acting during a specific period of
time and we assumed that all other activities by employees
were not malicious.
The most important challenges we faced when applying our
system to real data were the ethical and privacy implications.
In addition to the data protection act, the organisation had strict
policies in place on how employee’s data may be processed.
From the university side, there are ethics rules that every
researcher has to abide by. In order to comply with these
policies, we decided to focus only on anonymised data and
more importantly never to store the data on a machine outside
the organisation’s firewall. Access to the anonymised data was
only available to the head of security of the organisation.
The sensitivity of the data required us to adopt a bastion
approach to deploy our detection system. We provided the
organisation with a pre-configured machine with the tool
installed, which was based at their headquarters. We also
configured a different machine to which we did have access to
and used this to upload our code for debugging purposes. The
organisation would then synchronise the updated versions of
the system to the machine placed at headquarters, try to run
the system and report back with results. More specifically,
an SSH public key was sent to a gateway machine on the
organisation’s DMZ. The code never ran from that particular
machine and the raw data logs were never accessible to this
machine. Figure 2 shows the CITD system configuration in
the multinational organisation.
Regarding the way the organisation reported results, we
did not obtain a detailed list of the alerts that the system
generated. The organisation provided us only statistical in-
formation regarding the number and severity of alerts (low or
high deviation), the number of employees we generated alerts
for and the type of alerts (i.e. suspicious file activity) along
with the dates for when these alerts were generated for the
malicious insider only.
It is important to note that the purpose of our testing was
not to identify whether other employees acted maliciously but
to test whether the system was able to detect a known insider
in historical data; at no point was any other employee under
consideration of being an insider nor under scrutiny from the
organisation; more importantly because the alerts raised by
our system are indicative of anomalous behaviour but not
necessarily of suspicious behaviour only. Anomaly detection
is merely one element of a multi-pronged approach towards
detecting malicious behaviour with complementary elements
from data on employee behaviour and off-line activities such
as travelling and performance reviews providing additional
insight. The person who acted maliciously during the period
of data we processed, had admitted their actions and had been
prosecuted by the organisation. No personal details about this
person nor the nature of their attack were revealed to us.
Fig. 1. Architecture of the insider threat detection system described in detail in [9]. The system is constructed by a number of parsers and components
that interpret log data records to create user and role tree profiles. There exist three levels of alerts: policy violations and tripwires based on well known
attacks, threshold-based anomalies and deviation-based anomalies. Alerts are visualised to analysts who may provide feedback on the validity of the alert and
reconfigure the sensitivity of the system.
A. Deciding on relevant datasets
The organisation records different types of log activities.
The format of the logs differs significantly, requiring several
parsers to process the data. There was also not a straightfor-
ward way to link every activity to a user. Some logs did not
include a username as a field and linking this type of activity to
a specific individual required further analysis and examination
of other type of logs.
We had several meetings with the head of security to
understand the format of the data collected, as well as which
insider attacks are prevalent in such environment. The most
common and serious threat for this organisation is IP theft. The
organisation stores the most sensitive documents in an internal
database and only authenticated users are allowed to access
these files. To the best of our knowledge, they do not have an
automated detection system to identify suspicious downloads
of files by employees nor a team to manually examine which
employees exhibit suspicious behaviour. We aimed to test the
system on multiple data sources, but in the end we limited our
testing to only data produced by file-access logs, which were
of most interest to the organisation. We designed the system,
however, to be able to parse and process all the different data
sources.
We decided to consider data regarding:
• File-access logs
• Patent DB interactions
Fig. 2. The organisation has sensors placed collecting network-based and host-based activities (meta-data). These datasets were aggregated to a single point.
Prior to our visit to the organisation we obtained data type descriptions and wrote relevant parsers to convert their data types to a CSV format. All CSV files
relate to activities only. How the data is aggregated and monitored is determined by the organisation.
• Directory DB interactions
B. Scalability issues
In [9], the synthetic scenario which contained the biggest
number of users and comprised the most data, included 20,000
data entries per day and 300 employees who were spread
across five different roles. In this case however, the file access
logs provided more than 750,000 data entries per day. These
logs were not chronologically ordered and did not contain
information about the role of each employee. Additional
processing was required to link employees to roles. It is worth
noting that the roles were anonymised (R1, R2 etc) even
though we never got access to this file.
The overwhelming amount of data and the additional pro-
cessing to link employees to activities and roles, resulted in
hardware limitations, which could have been surpassed by de-
ploying the system in a more powerful machine. We decided,
however, to focus on data which derived from authenticated
users. Unauthenticated file logs resulted only in denial of
sensitive files. According to the head of security authenticated
logs provide the most interesting information regarding insider
threats. Parsing only authenticated data entries resulted in a
significant reduction in the amount of data from 750,000 to
44,000 entries per day. Another advantage of authenticated
logs lies in the straightforward link between a specific action
and a user, meaning that no further processing of the logs was
required.
Authenticated file-access logs provided information about
the user, the date and time when the activity was conducted,
the type of activity, the size of the file and the standard
response code from the server. The information acquired from
the logs differed significantly to the information which the file
system logs of the synthetic scenarios in [9] provided. These
differences rendered some of the anomaly metrics used for the
synthetic scenarios irrelevant and new anomalies pertinent to
the organisation were defined.
The file access logs comprise five different types of activities
namely X1, X2, X3, X4, X5 1. We decided to focus on
these activities and monitor deviations in employees’ requests.
Attributes attached to these activities were the size of the file
and the standard server response code. Therefore, we defined
five anomaly metrics for the file system logs which share the
same attributes (size of the file and standard http responses).
These are:
• X1 anomaly
• X2 anomaly
• X3 anomaly
• X4 anomaly
• X5 anomaly
Alerts on X1 anomaly, X2 anomaly, X3 anomaly and
X4 anomaly would suggest that the user downloaded an
unusual number of files, whereas an X5 anomaly alert would
denote that a user created or modified many files (resulting in
a possible integrity issue, or sabotage efforts).
C. Results
We applied the CITD detection system to file access logs
over two different periods (1 September to 31 October and 1
December to 31 December). The overall number of employees
was 16,000 and although we were able to modify the code
to cater for the roles which employees possess, due to the
sensitivity of data we never got access to the file, thus the
1Due to non-disclosure agreements the format of the logs, and the names
of the anomalies which were indicative of the type of the log are anonymised
in this paper.
number of roles is unknown. The organisation had already
identified suspicious activity and the insider had acted mainly
on late September and October. Unsurprisingly, in the runs of
the system that considered data from December 2014 period
we did not generate an alert for this insider. We did, however,
generate several alerts on our last run which focused on data
from September 2014 and October 2014 as predicted.
In more detail, the first run of the system was on data from
December 2014 and consisted of a training period of seven
days. Determining what activity should constitute the normal
profile is a challenging task. In the case of our data, there may
well be malicious activity in these seven days. Our validation
piece was focused only on detecting a well-known insider.
Alternatively, there should be a more sanitised version of data
to provide the grounds for the development of normal profile.
We used PCA to reduce the features on two dimensions and
the system generated ∼4,000 alerts for ∼3,000 employees. Of
these alerts, ∼1000 were of Red severity, indicating deviations
greater than four units. In order to reduce the number of
alerts, we introduced new features tailored to the needs of the
organisation based on the types of threats they believe they
find. The new features were the number of unique new files
for every activity, the number of unique current files for any
activity and the overall size of files a user accessed for every
activity. We calculated these features for every role as well.
We added a subset of the new features to the system to en-
sure that its performance would be acceptable (the complexity
of PCA algorithm is O(n∗m3) where n is the number of days
we process the data for and m is the number of features. It is
clear that introducing new features increases the computation
time substantially). Our decision on which features to add
was based on the experiences that the head of security had
regarding previous incidents (i.e X5 logs were not considered
at all and the number of X1 logs was crucial). We tested
the system again on the same data and for the same training
period, while increasing the dimensions of PCA to three. We
managed to reduce the number of alerts from ∼4000 to ∼2700
(33% reduction). This time however, we generated only 297
alerts of Red severity (70% reduction) for 235 users, which is
a significant improvement.
The final run of the system considered data from September
and October 2014, period where we knew an insider acted ma-
liciously. We generated 129,797 alerts (of which 42,420 were
of Red significance) for 4,129 individuals. Concerning the
individual who the organisation suspected of insider activity,
we generated several alerts of Orange significance (deviations
greater than three but less than four units) pertaining to this
person. What is of interest about this individual, however, is
not the significance of the alerts but the fact that he/she raised
an alert for every anomaly the system is calculating, resulting
in twelve alerts in a single day. Bearing in mind that on
average we produced for the period of two months ∼0.5 alerts
per employee per day (a/e ∗ d = 129, 797/4, 129 ∗ 60 ∼ 0.5
where a is the number of alerts the system produced, e is the
number of employees the system produced an alert for and
d is the number of days we have data for), getting 12 alerts
in a single day is a significant indication. There was no other
employee who generated so many different type of alerts for
such a short period of time and the ratio of alerts per user over
the period of 60 days followed a normal distribution with the
average alerts per day for user’s being 0.5 and the units of
standard deviation being 1.5, meaning that 95% of employees
for whom we generated an alert for had between 0 and 3.5
alerts per day.
More specifically, for the 29-9-2014 we generated alerts
regarding:
• X1 anomaly
• X2 anomaly
• X3 anomaly
• X4 anomaly
• this anomaly
• any anomaly
• new anomaly
• current anomaly
• hourly anomaly
• user anomaly
• role anomaly
• total anomaly
The individual had increased activity on accessing files
(X1, X2, X3, X4 anomalies). In addition, the individ-
ual had significant variations from his normal profile
(user anomaly), accessed files on different hours than usual
(hour anomaly) while he requested an unusual number of new
files (new anomaly), as well as an unusual number of files he
had visited in the past (this anomaly and current anomaly).
Finally, his overall behaviour deviated from the behaviour that
people holding his/her role exhibited.
For the 30-9-2014 we generated alerts regarding:
• hourly anomaly
On this day the individual accessed files on unusual hours.
For the 20-10-2014 we generated alerts regarding:
• X1 anomaly
• hourly anomaly
The individual requested an unusual number of files
(X1 anomaly) and accessed these files on unusual hours.
For the 21-10-2014 we generated alerts regarding:
• hourly anomaly
On this day the individual accessed files on unusual hours.
For the 21-10-2014 we generated alerts regarding:
• X1 anomaly
• X2 anomaly
• this anomaly
• hourly anomaly
The individual requested an unusual number of files
(X1 anomaly, X2 anomaly, this anomaly) and accessed these
files on unusual hours.
While the number of employees we generated alerts for
concerns 25% of the staff (as a multinational organisation,
people’s working hours tend to change significantly), further
statistical analysis on the generated alerts, reduces significantly
the number of false positives.
We are in the process of further refining these results, by
focusing on the anomalies which are more indicative of IP
theft (i.e. X1 anomaly) and the interpretation of the alerts
produced for individuals per day (i.e. how many alerts per
day is a significant indication of suspicious behaviour, are
there alerts which appear only when insiders act (in this case
for example the insider generated always an hour anomaly).
In addition, we are introducing more features to reduce the
noise (i.e. number of rejected requests for documents) and the
number of false-positive alerts.
V. REFLECTING ON THE RESULTS TO REFINE THE SYSTEM
Applying the CITD system to a real-world dataset inevitably
generated false-positive alerts (alerts for behaviours that do not
signify an insider threat) and false negatives (behaviours that
should have generated alerts but remained unidentified). In our
case study, however, the ground truth becomes complicated.
We can be certain for the minimum number of false negative
alerts which the system generated, however, the number of
false-positive alerts remains questionable. An alert could either
indicate a false-positive or an attack that has not been detected
thus far by the organisation.
Our system provides a variety of configuration options to
cater for cases where the results are not representative of the
ground truth. Our next steps on the validation methodology
will focus on decreasing the number of false-positive and
false-negative alerts by examining the source of their origin.
The generation of an increasing number of false-positive
alerts has its origins in the erroneous perception of what the
norm is. There may be cases where the behaviour of the
employees varies daily and their activities differ significantly
(i.e. research and development departments where the working
hours, number of emails sent, number of files accessed change
radically over a period of time). In such cases a more dynamic
representation of the norm is suggested.
We therefore intend to explore the use of dynamic profiles.
Instead of aggregating all the benign data to capture the normal
profile of a user, we will consider as normal profile the last
thirty days of the users’ data. For every following day, we
would delete the oldest data entry of the normal profile and
insert the newest observation provided it did not constitute
an anomaly. Furthermore, there might be cases where the
norm may appear as suspicious behaviour. For example, the
number of emails that a sales person will send and receive
is far greater compared to the number of emails a software
developer is likely to receive. In these scenarios the system
could be configured to be less sensitive in what constitutes an
anomaly.
Regarding false negatives, their source of origin is the
undetected attacks. The behaviour of the insiders may be very
subtle or hidden under legitimate usage of the system. In such
scenarios, the system can be reconfigured to become more
sensitive to changes in behaviour. In case where subtle attacks
were executed in the past, policy rules may be designed to
indicate such situations. For example, an insider whose end-
goal is to download a sensitive file, may start downloading
various files to conceal the real attack, thus the normal profile
will not defer significantly from the characteristics of the
attack. We are in the process of creating trip-wired rules based
on the policies of the organisation to capture these more subtle
attacks.
A. Anomaly metric performance assessment
In all applications of the system, we assigned the same value
to all the weights of each anomaly, assuming no prior knowl-
edge of different types of attacks the organisation experienced.
Once we have a better understanding of which anomaly metric
is error-prone we may wish to reduce its influence in the
generation of the second-tier and third-tier alerts. Similarly,
since we have evidence that for the organisation theft of
sensitive files is a prominent type of attack, we will increase
the value of the weight for the file anomaly.
The aforementioned suggestions consider changes after the
PCA algorithm is applied. We intend to make changes to
render the PCA algorithm more efficient and improve its
outcome, which is the eigenvector and the eigenvalues. By
default, when applying PCA we include the data of the day
under investigation to the normal profile. We will, however,
apply PCA only to the normal profile and then project the
data of the day under investigation to the new eigenvalues and
eigenvectors.
In addition, we will try to run PCA with more dimensions to
increase the variability of our data. By default the system con-
siders only the first two dimensions of the eigenvectors which
reduce dramatically the number of variables to consider, thus
rendering the system faster, and allow for visualisation tools
to project the data in a two dimensional space. Reducing the
dimensions, however, results in loss of information. Increasing
the default number of the final dimensions may provide better
results in cases where there are many features to consider.
VI. LESSONS LEARNT
The process of validation provided useful lessons not only
for the CITD project but for the broader research community.
Below we describe how organisational development and op-
erational lessons could be broadly applied to other projects
and inform decisions for the overall system architecture and
considerations before validating these tools. We also present
lessons regarding algorithmic inputs and alert outputs which
will inform the future work for the CITD project.
A. Organisational development
In terms of broader organisational development, a criti-
cal task for the successful deployment of detection tools is
to establish procedures that will adhere to security policies
and privacy rules that organisations have in place. We have
demonstrated that it is feasible to validate a system without
ever viewing the anonymised version of the input data. It is
also important for the organisations to understand that the
alerts the system may produce are not evidence of insider
activity and may provide indications of deviations which may
well be benign. An issue that may occur is that sometimes
organisations may have a legal obligation to follow any alerts
detection and monitoring systems provide, even during trial
periods. In such cases, organisations may be reluctant to
provide full access to datasets or report detailed results of
the system.
Interviewing system administrators and employees respon-
sible for securing the operations of the organisation is an
important part of the deployment and validation process. It
allows to shed light into what type of attacks are prevalent,
what data types are relevant in identifying these attacks
and which metrics tools could rely on to capture suspicious
activity. We benefited greatly from our interactions with the
head of security and managd to reduce the number of false
positives alerts.
B. Operational issues
In terms of operational issues, deploying the CITD detection
tool to data from a multinational organisation allowed us to
identify which parts of the system are applicable to different
contexts without alterations and which parts require modifi-
cations. We expect that deployemnt of other detection tools
would lead to similar conclusions. It is evident for example
that the format of the data to be used as input is a significant
factor in system’s adaptability. Environments which record
logs with similar format would require a minimum number
of changes. In real-world datasets, however, the format of
the data will be very different, requiring appropriate parsers
to interpret it. Due to the different format of the data, the
anomaly metrics identified in [9] may not be always applicable
and novel anomalies deriving from the logs may need to be
defined.
Writing parsers to tailor data for input is a straightforward
process. Understanding the data, however, and highlighting
interesting information which could give rise to suspicious be-
haviour is a demanding and time-consuming task. We believe
this would be a challenge for every detection system. Other
challenges relevant to detection systems which create user
profiles include identifying activities which belong to the same
user and linking different datasets to construct a normal profile.
We also need to acknowledge the limitations in the availability
of datasets due to legal restrains and monitoring practices,
which limit the efficiency of our system (email content, albeit
rich in information, is extremely difficult to get access to due
to ethical and legal considerations).
Focusing on the CITD system, once the data parsers are
in place, activities and their attributes are well defined, and
the anomaly metrics are set, the core functionality of the
system does not require any modifications to process this
information and output alerts. The tree structure profile is able
to process any list of activities and attributes, irrespective of
their name, and the anomalies which depend on role and time
characteristics are agnostic to the anomaly metrics tailored for
specific contexts (i.e. role anomalies and hourly anomalies
are computed in any context without further modification
needed). We encountered, however, scalability issues due to
the amount of information stored in these profiles. In order
to render the system scalable for the magnitude of data an
organisation produces, we are considering filtering the data
stored as activities and attributes in the system. This solution
may limit the system’s ability to extract certain features,
however, storing every single file a user has visited may not
always provide useful results. Instead, storing sensitive files
which organisations strive to protect may be a more efficient
way to move forward.
C. Algorithmic lessons
Regarding algorithmic lessons, PCA and the rational behind
triggering alerts in all three tiers is applicable in any context
and requires only subtle modifications. These modifications
pertain to the maximum number of dimensions in which PCA
is executed. The number of dimensions depends on the features
generated for the anomaly metrics and since these are context-
dependent the highest possible dimensions are calculated by
d−1 where d denotes the number of activities in each context.
It may also be useful to create alerts that will pertain to certain
organisations, allowing users to define which features should
be selected.
D. Output of alerts
Concerning the output of alerts, we believe that the first-tier
alerts can be tailored to capture policies for specific contexts,
thus identifying subtle attacks. Second-tier alerts capture sus-
picious behaviour by distinguishing anomalies when a user’s
behaviour compared to the normal profile differs more than a
certain threshold. Weights associated with anomalies allow us
to focus on specific behaviours and tune the system if needed.
Third-tier alerts are the most effective according to our results.
These alerts are generated when a user’s behaviour deviates
from the normal behaviour more than a specified number of
units. Our findings suggest that alerts which indicate deviation
more than 2 standard units provide the most decisive indicators
of suspicious behaviour and statistical analysis on the alerts
per user may reduce the number of false positives and provide
useful insights.
VII. FUTURE WORK
The validation strategy focused on the anomaly detection
algorithms and explored the effectiveness of the third tier alert.
As insiders obtain better knowledge of the detection systems
in place and endeavour to mask their abnormal behaviours, it
is getting more difficult to compute effective anomaly scores.
Identifying attack patterns can be extremely helpful, as these
patterns can provide the mechanism for combining different
features and anomaly metrics used by detection systems, and
set the context for understanding anomalous behaviour.
We have captured different insider attacks in the form of
attack trees which provide a solid framework for identifying
subtle attacks, cases where employees collude to orchestrate an
attack and solid ground for reasoning regarding the employees’
motivations [34]. Incorporating these attack patterns into the
system in the form of policy alerts would be one avenue
for future research. It would allow the system to cater for
the aforementioned attacks and reason about the behavioural
aspects of people based on their online activity.
Therefore, we intend to focus on formally describing and
designing policies for the first level alerts. These policies
would have a two-fold purpose; to capture violations of
policies designed by Human Resources (HR); and to describe
behaviours that may be indicative of problematic behaviour
even if this behaviour does not constitute a violation of a HR
policy, based on the attacks trees identified in.
Due to the lack of data indicative of the psychological
profile and personality trait of employees, our system does
not consider behavioural indicators for detecting concerning
behaviour. If such data were available, these would form an-
other feature dimension and would feed the anomaly metrics.
Unfortunately, recording accurately data for stress indicators
or organisational commitment is an extremely difficult task
and further research is needed particular in exploring how the
use of language, login times, or variation in keystrokes can be
linked to personality traits.
At the moment the results deriving from PCA are processed
by standard deviation and Mahalanobis distances to identify
significant changes in employees’ profiles. More method-
ologies and machine learning techniques could be adopted.
A useful exercise would be to explore the results of these
techniques when applied to different contexts and correlate the
effectiveness of these techniques with specific insider attacks.
In addition, we could focus on designing Bayesian networks
based on the attack-pattern trees and link these with anomaly
metrics.
Another avenue for future work could be the development
of a dashboard visualisation to provide a better understanding
of the alerts the system is raising. As described in Section III,
the alerts regarding the insider were of average severity but the
number of these over a short period of time was significantly
different to the distribution of alerts for other users. The
number of alerts on a daily basis flagged by detection systems
must be manageable by security analysts in organisations.
Dealing with an overwhelming number of alerts will be
counter-productive in the long-term for the detection of insider
threats, especially in the case where most of these are false
positive alerts. Visual representation of alerts though provides
opportunities to better realise patterns in these alerts and
insights into the nature of the alerts. We have started testing
visualisation techniques and the results are promising.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
While insider threat is becoming an increasing concern
within industry, the difficulties researchers are experiencing
in gaining access to real datasets to validate their systems is
slowing down the implementation of more effective methods
to deter insider attacks. This work reflects on the results, our
thoughts and our experiences in applying our CITD system to
a real multinational organisation.
Our approach abided to the organisational ethical and pri-
vacy considerations. During our experiments we had at no time
access to the datasets and the organisation was responsible
to run the system. All the detection output was filtered by
the head of security and only statistical information about the
alerts was provided as well as feedback about our system’s
computational and detection performance. We used this infor-
mation to continually update our approach and improve the
system’s accuracy.
Our tool processed historical file logs of 16, 000 users and
extracted features to create normal baselines of behaviour.
The organisation had already identified malicious activity from
one of the employees and our validation method focused on
identifying alerts for this individual. From the explored detec-
tion methods, dimensionality reduction using PCA combined
with anomaly detection using standard deviation provided very
good results. Although the system generated false-positive
alerts, which could be related to a non-identified attack or
to a real false identification, further statistical analysis of
the results provided significant indications of the insider’s
malicious activity.
The opportunity to apply the system on real datasets re-
vealed scalability limitations concerning the vast amount of
data which needs to be processed and identified issues on
linking certain activities to users. We provided strategies for
refining the system and highlighted the value of having a
data curator both for data protection and system performance
feedback purposes.
In the future, we intend to deploy our tool in other or-
ganisations, incorporate attack patterns as part of our be-
havioural detection and establish means to develop policy
tripwires (signatures), not strictly intended as means to indicate
maliciousness of a policy breaking, but as means to indicate
where problematic behaviours exists. In turn, this may inform
policy-makers where shifts in policies should change due to
operational issues.
Validating the CITD system in real data provided the
grounds to assess the effectiveness of the system. Our results
suggest that the PCA rational and the three tier approach
can capture a wide range of alerts with relative success and
generate a small number of false-positive alerts. In addition,
projecting data in higher dimensions decreases the number
of false-positive alerts. We are confident that building the
normal profile for users and roles which employees hold,
and calculating deviations based on PCA results is the first
and decisive step towards designing a system for detecting
anomalous behaviour indicative of insider threat.
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